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Whether as a target of interesting disagreement, or as tool that can be refined, 
extended, or even implemented, to have one’s ideas taken up is perhaps the happiest 
fate of any bit of philosophical work. So, it is with some gratitude that I have this 
opportunity to reflect on some recent discussion of my “On the Value of Philosophy: 
The Latin American Case” (2010). I focus on two articles: Robert Sanchez’s wide-
ranging and challenging “Strengthening the Case for Latin American Philosophy” 
(2014), and Carlos Pereda’s exquisitely titled and richly developed “On Mexican 
Philosophy, For Example” (2019, in this journal). Despite the appearance of 
disagreement between the parties, the exchange makes clear that there is considerable 
convergence amongst us about the value of Latin American philosophy.          
 
1.  VALUE IN MARGINALITY 
 
In “On the Value of Philosophy: The Latin American Case” (2010) I took up the 
question of whether there is any reason for philosophers in the United States (and the 
rest of the Anglophone world) to pay attention to philosophy produced in Latin 
America. The argument in that article was that (surprise!) there is value in Latin 
American philosophy, that it serves the various philosophical interests we ordinarily 
have in philosophy, and moreover, that reflection on the history of philosophy in 
Latin America suggests that it is a good place to look for underappreciated resources 
for helping us address questions in Anglophone philosophical projects.  
  Although I maintain that philosophy in Latin America is often enough interesting 
in and of itself, the weight of the argument in that article turned on a picture of about 
the value of philosophy, and the value of philosophical traditions outside of one’s 
own (in this case—the Anglophone philosophical canon, however that is construed). 
The idea was that a cursory look at the history of philosophy in Latin America reveals  
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examples that anticipate ideas that we now regard as valuable in Anglophone 
philosophy that this fact gives us reason to think that philosophical work produced in 
Latin American philosophy is not merely unoriginal, derivative dreck. Thus, counter 
to its (perhaps still common) perception, Latin America philosophy is a storehouse of 
complex cultural objects—philosophical ideas, theories, distinctions—that satisfy the 
standard of philosophical interestingness internal to wide swaths of Anglophone 
philosophy.  
  Were I to re-write the article today, I would emphasize a point that is continuous 
with the above, but not made explicit in the original article. This picture—of 
philosophy as a kind of cultural resource, and of Latin American philosophy as 
plausibly meeting standards of prima facie philosophical value—also means that there 
are plausibly distinctive resources in Latin American philosophy precisely because 
the history of philosophy unfolded differently. There are sometimes ideas, or 
combinations of ideas, that did not occur in the Anglophone canon in the same way, 
and that had different roles in the economy of philosophy. This fact is valuable both 
for its own sake, and for the light it can cast on what is contingent and perhaps an 
available alternative to our current configurations of convictions.  
  In sum, this double fact, of Latin American philosophy’s value in the way that all 
philosophy is valuable (roughly, as a kind of cultural resource in domains where we 
lack convergence on methods and truths) and as a set of resources with its own 
history, configuration, and development, is the basis for arguing that there is good 
prima facie reason for Anglophone philosophers to think that there is something of 
recognizable value to be found in the study of Latin American philosophy.  
 
2.  REFLECTIONS ON A FIRST ENGAGEMENT 
 
Robert Sanchez (2014) objects to the foregoing account on at least two grounds. First, 
he maintains that by arguing that philosophy in Latin America has the value that all 
philosophy has, effectively demotivates Anglophone philosophers from studying it 
because there is no special reason to study it. The crucial impediment is the fact of 
finite attention. Simply noting that some bit of philosophy is valuable qua philosophy 
is not a reason to prioritize its study, nor a reason to alter standing conceptions of the 
canon. Second, he argues that the account “overlooks philosophy’s capacity to call 
into question or disrupt an entire culture or tradition” (4). In particular, he claims that 
this picture of philosophy’s value cannot account for the value of Socratic irony as 
“disruptive or destructive” and as “disobedience, a suspension, or a disruption” of the 
existing culture (5).   
  On the matter of the first point, Sanchez is obviously right that disciplinary 
attention is finite, so simply noting that Latin American philosophy is valuable (that it 
can be original, prescient, interesting, and so on) is not by itself sufficient to capture 
the attention of the typical Anglophone philosopher. 
  My ambition in “On the Value of Philosophy” was not to explain why there is a 
special or unique value in Latin American philosophy (although I gestured at one way 
to extend those arguments in that direction, above). Rather, my goal was to make it 
210 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 10.1 (2019)  VARGAS 
plausible that there are valuable things there to be found there, if someone wants to 
look there. My interest was not to make a decisive argument that showed that 
philosophers in the Anglophone world must necessarily attend to philosophy from 
Latin America. I am not sure there is any argument that can do that. My goal was to 
make it easier for others to argue (in their papers, their classrooms, in their hiring 
meetings) that the arguably default presumption in the Anglophone profession that 
there is nothing interesting or valuable in Latin American philosophy ought to be 
replaced with a different default assumption, namely, that there is something 
interesting and valuable there.  
  This is a modest argument, but I like to think it is not entirely useless to have 
made it explicit. Even so, Sanchez wasn’t wrong to note its limits, and to insist that 
many philosophers working in Latin American philosophy would want to argue for 
something much stronger, namely, that there is a special value in Latin American 
philosophy. Above, I gestured at one consideration that seems to bolster the prospects 
for that aspiration: inasmuch as Latin American philosophy has its own history, its 
own configuration of ideas, and its own original work, there is good reason to think it 
can help us see things that we do not already see about matters we already have good 
reason to care about. This is not a fully fleshed-out argument, here or in the earlier 
article, but it is very much in keeping with the Sanchez’s concern.  
  Even so, this too is a limited argument, in that it is not intended to exclude the 
possibility of other, better, or more compelling arguments. It does give us an 
overarching receipt for generating more detailed arguments in this vein, however. 
Pick your favorite topics (especially in social and cultural philosophy), do a real dive 
into Latin American philosophy, and you are bound to find alternatives that force us 
to reconsider what otherwise might have struck us (qua Anglophone philosophers) as 
fixed, given, or certain in their configuration, historical motive, or effective 
deployment.  
  What more is required to capture disciplinary attention in Anglophone 
philosophy? I doubt there is a single answer to this question for all times, places, and 
purposes. One strategy among many is to show our Anglophone colleagues how 
figures and ideas rooted in Latin America help us make sense of issues and ideas that 
already matter in our shared philosophical world. This is a strategy I have 
recommended and pursued elsewhere (for example, Vargas forthcoming a; Vargas 
forthcoming b).  
  Even if it is effective, it is unlikely to be the only effective strategy. Translation, 
highlighting curricular and enrollment pressures, growing familiarity with what there 
is in Latin American philosophy, and shifting sense of what is canonical and what is 
profitably counter-canonical (Cf. Rickless 2018, Vargas forthcoming b), and so on, 
each offer opportunities for shifting disciplinary attention. In short, I agree with 
Sanchez that showing the value of a bit of philosophy does not guarantee attention for 
that work. It is, however, a first step (although maybe not much more than that) 
towards answering the “Why bother?” question that has sometimes affected the 
reception of work outside Anglophone philosophy (Cf. Pereda 2019).  
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  With respect to Sanchez’s second objection, that my account fails to capture the 
Sanchez’s preferred story about the value of philosophy—that is, Socratic irony 
understood as a broadly skeptical, critical stance to a culture or tradition—it is helpful 
to turn to some recent reflections by Carlos Pereda.  
 
3.  REFLECTIONS ON A SECOND ENGAGEMENT 
 
In a recent article in this journal, Carlos Pereda makes a sustained and compelling 
case for the value of Mexican philosophy, and Latin American philosophy more 
generally, as a tool for expanding and enriching the philosophical tradition as it is 
understood outside of Latin America (and within parts of Latin America).  
  I find myself in the happy position of agreeing with a great deal of what Pereda 
says.1 He is surely right that our understanding of various abstract questions in 
philosophy can be profitably informed by intentionally considering phenomena from 
different levels of abstraction and by contrasting it with phenomena adjacent to those 
that are our central concerns. He calls these efforts the “strategy of passages” and the 
“strategy of detours,” respectively. His thought is that philosophy that exhibits these 
characteristics (i.e., “nomadic thought”) is especially fruitful. One can find such 
philosophy in Mexican philosophy, for example. He cites the work of Luis Villoro as 
a particularly lucid instance. So, there is good reason to attend to Mexican and Latin 
American philosophy as it has successfully incorporated both the universal and 
culturally specific.  
  Pereda considers whether his picture of nomadic thought’s products can be 
profitably understood as providing a kind of cultural resource of the sort that figures 
in my (2010) account. His answer is a tentative yes, but he goes on to take up an 
interpretive issue that arises in Sanchez (2010). Pereda notes that my anchoring the 
value of philosophy in a story about cultural resources—anything that assists in the 
flourishing, survival, or perpetuation of a given culture—can be interpreted as 
                                                
1 Perhaps the one place where we might have a substantive disagreement concerns whether there is a 
version of the universalists vs cultural particularists debate that cannot be dissolved in the way he 
recommends. I think there is at least one version of the debate that resists his dissolution: the 
historicism vs. anti-historicism debate. It is not obvious what Pereda thinks about that version of the 
debate, at least not in his (2019) piece. So, although I share with Pereda the thought that many fights 
between important versions of the “univeralist vs. culturalist” debates in the middle parts of the 20th 
century in Latin America were confused or fundamentally misconceived, the historicist/anti-historicist 
one seems to me more fundamental and more difficult to dissolve in the way he suggests. That said, I 
do think there is a kind of intermediate position available to us that fits well with much of what Pereda 
says. The view is this: we can make at least some important headway on philosophical issues without 
having to re-litigate the historicist/anti-historicist fight on every philosophical topic (Cf. Sánchez 
2018). Even the most dogged anti-historicist must allow that we can intelligibly ask questions about 
the philosophical import about the local, the particular, and the situated. There are reasonable and 
interesting questions to ask about social ontology, and the mapping of socially and culturally particular 
worlds, and the various normative pressures that arise within those worlds. Of course, it will be 
difficult to follow these threads out to their most fundamental grounds without taking a stand on the 
historicist/anti-historicist debate, but on the position I just sketched, we can do a good deal of valuable 
and interesting philosophy before then. 
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narrowly concerned with affirming a local conceptual or cultural configuration, where 
this does not include the disruptive, skeptical, critical attitude that characterizes 
Socratic irony. As Pereda notes, this is how Sanchez appears to interpret my account.  
  Pereda rightly observes that this is not a view I have to hold (142). Indeed, I do 
not hold it. Pereda goes on to argue that the most plausible reading of the role of 
philosophy-as-cultural-resource is one according to which critical, disruptive, and 
therapeutic versions of philosophy count as cultural resources, too. I concur. There is 
no reason why the important things identified by Sanchez—the sometimes disruptive, 
destabilizing features of philosophy—are not themselves important cultural resources.  
  So, in the end, I think we have an agreeable equilibrium point between the three 
of us. One way philosophy can be valuable is by challenging our received cultural 
and conceptual presumptions. Latin American philosophy, in virtue of its history and 
manner of development, as well as its distinct (relative to most of Anglophone 
philosophy’s) place of origin has important and plausibly distinctive resources for 
challenging the cultural and conceptual presumptions of Anglophone philosophy. So, 
again, it is plausible to think that Latin American philosophy is valuable in both the 
general way that good philosophy is valuable. It is also plausibly valuable for 
disrupting or challenging our received views about culture, thought, and the world. 
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